Al‑Qaeda 25 years after 9/11: core weakened, affiliates strong

Twenty-five years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Al‑Qaeda no longer occupies the position of a single, global network that it once held. Its central leadership has been weakened by years of counter‑terror operations, yet powerful regional affiliates in parts of Africa and Asia continue to exert influence on the ground.

At the end of August 2026 the U.S. Department of the Treasury removed the former jihadist preacher Abdullah al‑Muhaysini from its sanctions list — a notable adjustment tied to Washington’s changed policy toward Syria. The same move saw the United States revoke the formal terrorist designation of Jabhat al‑Nusra and take Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham (HTS) off the list. These steps illustrate the shifting legal and political landscape around groups that once operated openly under Al‑Qaeda’s banner.

From a global network to local footholds

“In essence we must abandon a Eurocentric perspective,” says Rüdiger Lölker, an expert in Islamic studies. He and other analysts note that Al‑Qaeda and related jihadi movements historically have been more embedded outside Europe and the United States than Western observers realized. That is particularly true today in the Sahel, where Jama'at Nasr al‑Islam wal Muslimin has grown, in Somalia where Al‑Shabab remains active, and in Yemen where Al‑Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula holds a presence.

Lars Berger, a professor of terrorism studies, points out that the post‑2001 counter‑terror campaign — including military action in Afghanistan and enhanced intelligence and police cooperation — substantially degraded Al‑Qaeda’s central structure. “Viewed that way, the September 11 attacks were a major strategic failure for Al‑Qaeda,” he says. After the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, militants shifted strategy and sought permanent footholds in weak states or conflict zones such as parts of Africa and Yemen.

That local focus has a practical side as well: analysts describe an "economy of violence" in which kidnappings, smuggling and looting build revenue streams that sustain armed groups. Where state authority is weak and local conflicts simmer, jihadi organisations can exploit grievance and profit opportunities to recruit fighters and consolidate control.

Competition with the Islamic State also shaped Al‑Qaeda’s trajectory. “Fundamentally younger jihadis feel a greater attraction to the Islamic State,” says Benam Hajdenrojter‑Said of the Hamburg Police Academy. IS pursued more spectacular, media‑oriented attacks and for a time drew recruits; its later collapse left Al‑Qaeda as a surviving but transformed network that now relies more on gradual, local consolidation than on spectacular plots directed from a distant centre.

Exactly how dangerous Al‑Qaeda is at any given moment is difficult to gauge. “All emphasise in unison that at present there is practically no information about Al‑Qaeda. We simply do not know what they are doing at the moment,” Hajdenrojter‑Said warns. Recent major regional conflicts have been dominated by other actors — Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iran — while Al‑Qaeda’s profile has receded globally even as it entrenches regionally. Incidents such as the June 2026 attack on Niger’s Niamey international airport show affiliates are still capable of significant operations, underscoring that local strength can translate into sustained political and military power in fragile states.

Photo: AMISOM Public Information / Wikimedia Commons (CC0)